Some considerations on measuring the progressive principle violations and the potential equity in income tax systems by E. Mazurek & A. Vernizzi
 
 
 
 
http://stat.gov.pl/en/sit‐en/issues‐and‐articles‐sit/previous‐issues/ 
 
 
 
 
STATISTICS IN TRANSITION  
new series, Autumn 2013 
Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 467–486 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATISTICS IN TRANSITION new series, Autumn 2013 
 
467 
STATISTICS IN TRANSITION new series, Autumn 2013 
Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 467–486 
SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON MEASURING THE 
PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLE VIOLATIONS AND THE 
POTENTIAL EQUITY IN INCOME TAX SYSTEMS 
Edyta Mazurek1, Achille Vernizzi2 
ABSTRACT 
Kakwani and Lambert (1998) state three axioms which should be respected by an 
equitable tax system; then they propose a measurement system to evaluate at the 
same time the negative influences that axiom violations exert on the redistributive 
effect of taxes, and the potential equity of the tax system, which would be 
attained in absence of departures from equity. The authors calculate both the 
potential equity and the losses due to axiom violations, starting from the Kakwani 
(1977) progressivity index and the Kakwani (1984) decomposition of the 
redistributive effect. In this paper, we focus on the measure suggested by 
Kakwani and Lambert for the loss in potential equity, which is due to violations 
of the progressive principle: the authors’ measure is based on the tax rate re-
ranking index, calculated with respect to the ranking of pre-tax income 
distribution. The aim of the paper is to achieve a better understanding of what 
Kakwani and Lambert’s measure actually represents, when it corrects the actual 
Kakwani progressivity index. The authors’ measure is first of all considered 
under its analytical aspects and then observed in different simulated tax systems. 
In order to better highlight its behaviour, simulations compare Kakwani and 
Lambert’s measure with the potential equity of a counterfactual tax distribution, 
which respects the progressive principle and preserves the overall tax revenue. 
The analysis presented in this article is performed by making use of the approach 
recently introduced by Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2013). 
JEL Codes: C81, H23, H24 
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1. Introduction 
Since their very beginning taxes have mainly been the way to gather by the 
state the resources necessary to ensure its proper functioning. Apart from 
performing the fiscal function, the state, by means of taxes, influences the ‘fair’ 
distribution of income, thus fulfilling the redistribution function. As Kakwani and 
Lambert (1998), thereafter KL, observe, the redistribution function through the 
tax system has to be performed respecting social equity principles; two basic 
commands of social equity are “the equal treatment of equals and the 
appropriately unequal treatment of unequals” (KL, p. 369). As Aronson, Johnson 
and Lambert (1994, p.262) stress, equity violations should be considered for 
given “specifications of the utility/income relationship”.  
The redistributive effect of the income tax system can be measured by the 
difference between the Gini coefficients for the pre-tax income distribution and 
the post-tax income one, respectively. The difference between these two indexes 
measures how the income tax system reduces inequality in income distribution. 
The potential equity in the tax system is a value of the redistributive effect which 
might be achieved if all inequities could be abolished, by a rearrangement of tax 
burdens which substantially maintains either the tax revenue or the tax schedule. 
Rearrangements are generally performed by means of tax credits, exemptions, 
allowances, income splitting or quotient. The assessment of the potential equity 
requires a definition of an equitable tax system. 
KL propose an approach for measuring inequity in taxation. According to KL 
an equitable tax system should respect three axioms: (Axiom 1) tax should 
increase monotonically with respect to people’s ability to pay; (Axiom 2) richer 
people should pay taxes at higher rates; (Axiom 3) no re-ranking should occur in 
people’s living standards. In this paper we maintain the KL definition of equity in 
income taxation by means of the three axioms. Violations by an income tax 
system of each one of the three axioms provide the means to characterise the type 
of inequity present in an income tax system. A tax system is equitable if all 
axioms are satisfied.  
Let X be the pre-tax income or living standard1 T - the tax, and A - the tax-rate 
distribution, and Y - the disposable income. The three axioms ask that the ranking 
of T, A, and Y coincide with the ranking of X. It follows that, as KL suggest, the 
extent of each axiom violations can be measured by the Atkinson-Kakwani-
Plotnick re-ranking index of each attribute T, A and Y, with respect to the X 
ordering. 
By these re-ranking indexes, on the basis of the Kakwani (1977) progressivity 
index and of the Kakwani (1984) decomposition of the redistributive effect, KL 
evaluate the implicit or potential equity in the tax system, in the absence of 
inequities. In particular, by adding the tax re-ranking index to the Kakwani (1977) 
                                                          
1 KL, page 372, use the term living standard for X, assuming that nominal incomes have been 
transformed by a proper equivalence scale. 
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progressivity index they evaluate the potential equity which the tax system would 
reach in the absence of Axiom 1 violations. Analogously, by adding the tax-rate 
re-ranking index to the Kakwani progressivity index, they estimate the potential 
equity which the tax system would reach in the absence of Axiom 2 violations, 
that is to say, in the absence of the progressive principle violations. 
However, if the addition of the tax re-ranking index to the Kakwani 
progressivity index restores the progressivity which would be yielded without tax 
re-ranking, it is less simple to understand what happens when adding the tax-rate 
re-ranking index to the Kakwani progressivity index, as the next section 
illustrates. 
The aim of this paper is first of all to contribute to a better understanding of 
what the KL measure of the potential equity implies. In so doing, we try to 
contribute to the definition of alternative measures for the potential equity, which 
the tax system would yield if violations in the progressive principle were 
eliminated.  Our analysis is performed by making use of the approach recently 
introduced by Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2013). 
In Section 2 the measure of the potential equity and the losses generated by 
axioms violations are presented, as suggested by KL. Next we present the 
potential equity for three different cases:  
(1)   both Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 are respected, 
(2)   Axiom 2 is violated, whilst Axiom 1 is respected,  
(3)   Axiom 1 is violated, which implies that Axiom 2 is violated too. 
In fact, as KL observe,1 “a violation of minimal progression (Axiom 1) 
automatically entails a violation of the progressive principle” (Axiom 2). Section 
3 discusses KL’s potential equity measure by analysing it at the level of income 
unit pairs’ relations. This section also considers an alternative naïve measure for 
the potential equity. This measure is calculated by the Gini coefficient of the 
counterfactual tax distribution, which can be obtained by matching tax rates and 
pre-tax incomes, both ranked in non-decreasing order. Section 4 illustrates and 
completes the analytical considerations of previous sections by simulations 
performed on the income distribution of taxpayers from Wrocław (Poland). 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. The loss due to axiom violations and the potential equity in the tax 
system 
Let Kxxx ,..., 21  the pre-tax income levels of K income units, who are 
paying t1, t2, ...tK in tax. Both incomes and taxes can be expressed either in 
nominal values or in equivalent values. Moreover, let yi= xi− ti and ai= ti/xi  
represent the disposable income and the tax rate, respectively, which result in unit 
i (i=1, 2,...,K), after having paid tax ti.  
                                                          
1 Kakwani and Lambert (1998), page 371. 
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Let XG , TG , AG  and YG  be the Gini coefficients for  attributes X, T, A and Y, 
respectively. Let |Z XC  be the concentration coefficient for an attribute Z of 
income units (Z= T, A, Y) when the attribute Z is ranked by X, which refers to the 
pre-tax incomes lined up in ascending order. KL detect axiom violations via the 
three following Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani re-ranking indexes: 
( )| |T X T T XR G C= − , ( )| |A X A A XR G C= −  and ( )| |Y X Y Y XR G C= − .1 According to KL, 
if 0T XR > , Axiom 1 is violated; analogously, if | | 0A X T XR R− >  Axiom 2 is 
violated, and if 0Y XR >  it is Axiom 3 which is violated.
2  
KL use the three re-ranking indexes to evaluate the loss in the potential 
redistributive effect of the tax system. They represent the redistributive effect 
X YRE G G= − , which, on the basis of the Kakwani decomposition, can be written 
as 3 
|Y XRE P Rτ= − ,           (1) 
where τ is the ratio between the tax average - Tµ , and the disposable income 
average - Yµ . P is the Kakwani progressivity index,
 4 which is defined as follows: 
|T X XP C G= − .          (2) 
If no tax-re-ranking occurred, then TXT GC =| , and T XP G G= − . Therefore, 
KL can define |T XRτ  as the loss of redistributive effect due to tax re-ranking.
5 
The potential equity after the correction for income and tax re-ranking can then be 
defined as: 
( ) ( )XTXTTXXTXTT GGCGGCRPPE −=−+−=+= ττττ ||| .  (3) 
KL evaluate the loss due tax-rate re-ranking by the quantity ( )| |A X T XR Rτ − . 
In analogy to (3), after having corrected also for the tax-rate re-ranking, KL 
define the potential equity as: 
( ) ( )XXAXTXTXAXTA GRCRRRPPE −+=−++= ||||| ττττ .    (4) 
In order to understand how the corrections yield the potential equity as per 
formulae (3) and (4), we now gather income unit pairs into three different groups, 
according to Axiom 1 and 2 violations. 
                                                          
1 Being |Z Z XG C≥ , | 0Z XR ≥ . 
2 As KL observe (page 372), Axiom 3 can be violated only if Axiom 2 (and consequently Axiom 1) 
holds. 
3 See, e.g., Lambert (2001), pp. 238–242.  
4 Lambert (2001), ibidem. We observe that the progressivity index P does not contain any 
information on the incidence of taxation; τ is an indicator of the taxation incidence, which, 
conversely, does not contain any information on the progressivity: intuitively the redistributive 
effect is a function both of progressivity and of incidence.  
5 More details about equations (1) and (2) can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Group (1) includes income unit pairs presenting neither tax re-ranking nor tax 
rate re-ranking: for these pairs both Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 hold. 
Group (2) includes income unit pairs presenting tax rate re-ranking but no tax 
re-ranking: for these pairs Axiom 1 holds, whilst Axiom 2 is violated. 
Group (3) includes income unit pairs presenting both tax rate re-ranking and 
tax re-ranking: here, Axiom 1, and consequently Axiom 2, are both violated. 
 
According to this classification, TG , |T XC , |A XR  and XG  can split into three 
different components, ( )gTG , 
( )
|
g
T XC , 
( )
|
g
A XR  and 
( )g
XG  ( 32,1,g   = ), respectively, each 
related to one of the three different groups. This can be done by making use of the 
notation adopted by Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2013, page 3), and by a group 
selector function. Pellegrino and Vernizzi express the Gini coefficient in the 
following form: 
( )2
1 1
1
2
K K
Z
Z i j i j i j
i jZ
G z z p p I
Nµ −= =
= −∑∑ ,   where 
1:
1:
i jZ
i j
i j
z z
I
z z−
≥= − <
.  (5) 
In (5) pi and pj are weights associated to zi and zj, respectively; 
1
K
i
i
p N
=
=∑ ; Zµ  
is the average of Z, and Zi jI −  is an indicator function. 
When income units are lined up by ascending order of X, Pellegrino and 
Vernizzi write the concentration coefficient of attribute Z as:  
( ) || 2
1 1
1
2
K K
Z X
Z X i j i j i j
i jZ
C z z p p I
Nµ −= =
= −∑∑ ,   |
1:
1:
:
i j
Z X
i ji j
Z
i j i j
x x
x xI
I x x
−
−
>
− <= 
 =
.   (6) 
Consequently, they formulate the re-ranking index of Z with respect to X as: 
( ) ( )|| 2
1 1
1
2
K K
Z Z X
Z X i j i j i j i j
i jZ
R z z p p I I
Nµ − −= =
= − −∑∑ .     (7) 
Let us introduce the indicator function ( )gi jI − , which is 1 when the income unit 
pair {i, j} is classified into group g, and it is zero otherwise: ( )gi jI −  is then a group 
selector, which classifies each income unit pair into one of the three groups.1 For 
each of the three different groups we can write: 
( )( ) ( )2
1 1
1
2
K K
g T g
T i j i j i j i j
i jT
G t t p p I I
Nµ − −= =
= −∑∑ ,      (8) 
                                                          
1 More details on the indicator function ( )gi jI −  are in Appendix 3. 
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( )( ) | ( )| 2
1 1
1
2
K K
g T X g
T X i j i j i j i j
i jT
C t t p p I I
Nµ − −= =
= −∑∑ ,     (9) 
 ( ) ( )( ) | ( )| 2
1 1
1
2
K K
g A A X g
i j i j i j i j i jA X
i jA
R a a p p I I I
Nµ − − −= =
= − −∑∑ ,    (10) 
 ( )( ) ( )2
1 1
1
2
K K
g X g
X i j i j i j i j
i jX
G x x p p I I
Nµ − −= =
= −∑∑ .     (11) 
 
We observe that:1  
 ( ) ( )1T
1
XT GC =| , 
( ) ( )2
T
2
XT GC =| , 
( ) ( )3
T
3
XT GC −=| ; 
    ( ) ( )1A
1
XA GC =| , 
( ) ( )2
A
2
XA GC −=| , 
( ) ( )3
A
3
XA GC −=| ;     (12) 
from which 
( ) 0| =
1
XTR , 
( ) 0| =
2
XTR , 
( ) ( )3
T
3
XT GR 2| = ; 
    ( ) 0| =
1
XAR ,
( ) ( )2
A
2
XA GR 2| = ,
( ) ( )3
A
3
XA GR 2| =              (13) 
By making use of the expressions (8)-(11), we can split P, TPE  and APE  
defined by formulae (2), (3) and (4), into three components, P(g), ( )gTPE  and 
( )g
APE  ( 32,1,g   = ), respectively, each related to one of the three groups. In 
addition, using the observations (12) we have the following relations: 
 
 
- group (1) 
( ) ( ) ( )1
X
1
T
1 GGP −= , ( ) ( )11T PPE  τ= ,       (14) 
( ) ( )1
T
1
A PEPE = ;         (15) 
 
- group (2) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2
X
2
T
2 GGP −= , ( ) ( )22T PPE  τ=       (16) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )2XA22A RPPE | +=τ         (17) 
 
- group (3) 
( ) ( ) ( )3
X
3
XT
3 GCP −= | , 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )3X3T3XT33T GGRPPE −=+=   | ττ    (18) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )3X3XA3XT3XT3XA3T3A GRCRRPEPE −+=−+= ||||   ττ     (19) 
 
                                                          
1 For more details on equations (12), see Appendix 3. 
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We can see that, according to the KL method, in case (2), where only tax-rate 
re-ranking is present, ( )2XAR | corrects just for the loss due to tax-rate re-ranking 
(expression 17). In case (3), ( )3XAR |  corrects simultaneously both for tax and for tax-
rate re-ranking (expression 19). Having in mind (15), KL’s potential equity can 
then be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3
A
2
A
1
T
3
A
2
A
1
AA PEPEPEPEPEPEPE ++=++= .    (20) 
However, expression (19) and, as a consequence, expression (20) are 
measures which are not strictly faithful to what KL state (page. 372) “Axiom 2 is 
violated if the rankings by X and by A of income units pairs {i, j} for which Axiom 
1 holds differ [........]”. According to this statement, as all income units pairs, 
classified in case (3), present tax re-ranking and violate Axiom 2, they cannot be 
considered as violating Axiom 3, even if, as a consequence, they present tax-rate 
re-ranking too. In fact, the KL command specifies that tax-rate re-ranking should 
be considered only for income unit pairs classified in group (2). 
Then, if we want to observe literally the KL command, the potential equity should 
be written as:1 
( ) ( ) ( )3
T
2
A
1
TTA PEPEPEPE ++=, .        (21) 
Even if Pellegrino and Vernizzi (page 242) specify that their new measure 
should be adopted “If we want to observe literally the KL command”, they do not 
exclude adopting the original KL measure; they just stress that one should be 
aware that the KL measure “does not involve only income units pairs for which 
Axiom 1 holds”. Actually, as it will appear clearer in the pursue, the tax rate re-
ranking index often results to be greater that the tax re-ranking index, and this is 
coherent with the matter of fact that even after having eliminated tax re-ranking, 
tax-rate re-ranking can still persist.2 So in this article we shall consider both the 
original KL measure and the one introduced by Pellegrino and Vernizzi.  
In the next section we discuss how the potential equity measures act at the level of 
income pairs, in particular we will focus on (17) and (19). 
3. The potential equity at the microscope 
If we consider expression (3) for TPE , after having added |T XR  to |T XC , one 
yields the Gini coefficient of the tax liability distribution. Conversely, for what 
concerns APE , as per expression (4), we need more considerations in order to 
                                                          
1 Expression (21) can also be obtained by adding  τP  and *2S , defined in Pellegrino and Vernizzi 
(2013), at formula (9). 
2 Consider the following simple example: gross incomes {X: 1000, 2000, 3000, 5000}, taxes  
{T: 450, 400, 300, 200}. If we align taxes in ascending order and match them with incomes, the 
ratios {A: 200/1000, 300/2000, 400/3000, 450/5000} still remain in decreasing order, with respect 
to incomes. 
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interpret what one yields by adding |A XR  to |T XC . We shall now consider the 
effects of this addition at the level of the addends which constitute the sums in (9) 
and (10), which enter ( )2APE  and 
( )3
APE , given at (17) and (19), respectively. 
The sum of |T XC  and |A XR , can be expressed as: 
| | 2
1 1
1
2
K K
T X A X i j i j
i jT
C R d p p
Nµ −= =
+ = ∑∑ ,     (22) 
having defined 
( ) ( ) ( )| |T X A A Xi j i j i j i j X i j i jd t t I a a I Iλµ− − − −= − + − − ,    (23) 
with ( )T X Aλ µ µ µ= . 
In (23) the tax difference ( ) |T Xi j i jt t I −−  is “corrected” by adding a component 
which is either 0 or 2 i j Xa a λµ− :
1 that is to say, when a tax rate pair does not 
respect the X ordering, the absolute difference of the two tax rates is transformed 
into a monetary value by the constant factor Xλµ . 
In ( )3APE , the term ( ) |T Xi j i jt t I −−  is negative; then i jd −  has to express the 
redistributive effect between income units i and j, which would be potentially 
yielded after compensation both for tax and for tax rate re-ranking. As a 
consequence, i jd −  should be not lower, at least, than the term 
( ) Ti j i j i jt t I t t−− = − , which expresses the potential equity, when the correction is 
limited to tax re-ranking. This implies that: 
i j X i ja a t tλµ− ≥ − ,   i.e.    
i j i j
A T
a a t t
µ µ
− −
≥ .    (24) 
From the analysis reported in Appendix 2, there are more chances that 
inequality (24) is verified, than it is not. According to our simulations, reported in 
section 4, despite the fact that there is a not insignificant number of cases which 
do not verify (24), ( )3APE  happens to be always significantly greater than 
( )3
TPE . 
KL “found | |A X T XR R −   always to be non-negative in extensive simulations”.
2 
The results of our simulations reinforce KL’s findings. In fact, according to our 
experiments, not only the overall potential equity PEA is greater than the 
corresponding PET: even when considering only pairs in case (3), where 
expression (24) is not necessarily satisfied, ( )3APE  is generally greater than 
( )3
TPE . 
                                                          
1 In case (1) ( ) ( )|A A Xi j X i j i ja a I Iλµ − −− −  is equal to  0; in cases (2) and (3) it is 2 i j Xa a λµ− , as 
( )|A A Xi j i jI I− −−  is 2, when ( )i ja a−  is positive, and it is -2 when the difference is negative. 
2 Kakwani and Lambert (1998, page 373). 
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We could try to measure the loss due to Axiom 2 violations by introducing a 
counterfactual tax distribution, which respects Axiom 2. This counterfactual tax 
distribution could be obtained by matching tax rates and pre-tax incomes, both 
aligned in ascending order. Tax rates are then rescaled in order to maintain the 
same tax revenue. However, we have to be aware that, in so doing, we would not 
strictly follow KL’s command which asks that Axiom 2 violations should be 
“confined to those income unit pairs for which Axiom 1 {i, j} holds”. KL 
themselves do not fully respect their command as in measuring the extent of 
Axiom 2 violations by ( )| |A X T XR Rτ − , as a matter of fact, they consider all unit 
pairs for which Axiom 2 does not hold. 
In our opinion there are some reasons which could lead to considering all 
income unit pairs in evaluating the extent of Axiom 2 violations; in fact, after 
having matched both taxes and pre-tax incomes in ascending order, the tax rates 
derived from this matching do not necessarily become aligned in ascending order, 
as the example in footnote 11 illustrates. Consequently, the loss due to Axiom 2 
violations can go further than the loss due to Axiom 1 violations. 
If we denote this counterfactual tax distribution by TCF, and the Gini index for 
the counterfactual tax distribution by CFTG , the loss due to Axiom 2 violations 
could then be measured by ( )CFT TG Gτ − , and the expression for the potential 
equity would become: 
( )CF CFA T XPE G Gτ= − .        (25) 
In the case of CFT TG G< , further progressive counterfactual tax distributions 
could be generated by exploiting the progressivity reserve implicit in the tax 
system. In fact there are several counterfactual tax distributions which respect 
Axiom 2. For example, a more progressive counterfactual tax distribution could 
be generated by matching the pre-tax and income distribution and a modified tax-
rate distribution which a) maintains the same tax rates in the upper queue of 
A distribution, and b) lowers tax rates in the lower queue of A distribution. 
Obviously, both distributions being in ascending order. Operations a) and 
b) could be calibrated in such a way that the tax revenue remains the same as that  
of T.  
In the next section, we will evaluate the potential equity measures PET, PEA, 
PEA,T, and CFAPE , together with the incidence of cases which verify (24). 
4. Simulation results 
The measures of the potential equity, described in the previous section, were 
calculated for a Polish data set, by applying sixteen different hypothetical tax 
systems. The data come from the Lower-Silesian tax offices, 2001. The data set 
contains information on gross income for individual residents in the Municipality 
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of Wrocław (Poland). After deleting observations with non-positive gross income, 
the whole population consists of 37,080 individuals. For the analysis we used a 
random sample with size 10 000. The summary statistics for the sample of gross 
income distribution are: mean income = 18,980 PLN; standard deviation = 23,353 
PLN; skewness = 13.29; kurtosis = 424.05. The Gini coefficient for the pre-tax 
income distribution is 0.45611. 
The sixteen tax systems were constructed on the basis of four tax structures 
actually applied or widely discussed in Poland, from the simplest flat tax system 
to a more progressive tax system with four income brackets. In order to 
implement the “iniquity”, within each tax structure net incomes were “disturbed” 
by introducing four different types of random errors (more details are reported in 
Appendix 1).  
The resulting sixteen tax systems present RE indexes ranging from 0.141% to 
3.584 %. 
Table 1 reports basic indexes for the 16 tax systems, whereas Table 2 reports 
the potential equity measures for each tax system. 
From Table 1, columns (3), (4) and (5), we can see that in each tax system the 
most unit pairs belong to group (1), where neither tax re-ranking nor tax rate re-
ranking occurs. In four tax systems which derive from the Basic System 4, that is 
to say T-S_4, T-S_8, T-S_12 and T-S_16, the percentage of income unit pairs 
belonging to group (3) is slightly greater than that of pairs belonging to group (2). 
Group (2) is much more crowded than group (3) in the remaining tax systems.  
The percentage of pairs in group (3), which verify (24) (see Table 1, column 
6), is never lower than 37.95% and greater than 83.6%. This percentage is 
changeable. However, if we consider column (14) in Table 1, we can observe that 
the ratios ( ) ( )( )3T3XA GR /|  are stable at around 4 and a half. These empirical findings 
reinforce KL’s simulation results: whenever ( )3APE  is greater than 
( )3
TPE , a fortiori 
it is verified that A TPE PE> , as necessarily 
( ) ( )2
T
2
A PEPE ≥ . 
Beyond any discussion about how measuring the loss in potential equity due 
to Axiom 2 violations, the role of this Axiom appears evident from Table 2. 
Considering the differences between APE  (column 6) and TPE  (column 5), the 
marginal contribution to potential equity yielded in the absence of Axiom 2 
violations is greater, and, in some cases,  incomparably greater than that yielded 
by Axiom 1, which is given by the difference between TPE  and τP (column 4). 
This finding is not invalidated if we consider ,A TPE  (column 7), instead of APE , 
that is to say KL’s measure, corrected as per formula (20). The counterfactual 
CF
APE  potential equity gives different measures from APE , and in general the 
values estimated by the former are lower than those yielded by the latter; 
however, if one considers columns (6) and (8), distances present a much lower 
extent than those existing between column (6) and (5). 
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These results confirm the relevance of KL’s contribution on distinguishing the 
different sources of inequity, and so, under this aspect, in spite of their conceptual 
and empirical differences, APE , 
CF
APE  and ,A TPE  seem to give a coherent signal. 
In any case, in our opinion, further research and discussion is still needed to 
conceive a measure which can solve some remaining ambiguities. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have reconsidered the problem of measuring loss due to the 
progressive principle violations in a personal tax system. Our results confirm first 
of all the relevance of the contribution of Kakwani and Lambert’s article (1998). 
The violations of minimal progression (KL’s Axiom 1) and of the progressive 
principle (KL’s Axiom 2) produce different effects and these effects have to be 
kept distinct. According to our simulations, on the whole, violations of the 
progressive principle appear to be even more relevant than those regarding 
minimal progression. 
This note argues whether KL’s measure of the progressive principle needs 
some refinements. The authors’ measure implicitly transforms tax rate differences 
into tax differences by a factor which is constant, irrespective of income levels: 
this factor depends only on overall effects of a tax system, i.e. on the average tax 
rate and the average liability. 
We air the idea of measuring the potential equity by introducing 
counterfactual tax distributions. As an example, we have simulated the behaviour 
of a naïve tax distribution, obtained by matching tax rates and incomes, both 
aligned in ascending order. Tax rates have been rescaled in order to maintain the 
same tax revenue. On the one hand this naïve measure produces different values 
from those obtained through KL’s approach, on the other hand, it confirms the 
relevance of potential equity losses, due to Axiom 2 violations. 
However, the counterfactual measures here outlined can be applied if one 
does not exclude income unit pairs which do not respect minimal progression. We 
observed that, even after having restored minimal progression by matching both 
the tax and the pre-tax income distribution in ascending order, the resulting 
counterfactual tax rates are not necessarily in ascending order too. 
In conclusion, the discussion presented in this paper, which is based on the 
cornerstone represented by Kakwani and Lambert’s (1998) article, intends to be 
an initial contribution towards a satisfying measure for the potential equity when 
the progressivity principle is violated. 
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Table 1. Basic indexes: (1) neither tax re-ranking nor tax rate re-ranking, (2) tax 
 rate re-ranking, without tax re-ranking, (3) tax and  tax rate re-ranking.  
 GX×100=45.611; N=10,000 
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Table 2. Potential equity measures.  GX×100=45.611 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1. The simulated tax systems 
 
Four basic tax structures are hypothesised as follows: 
BASIC SYSTEM 1. One 15 per cent tax rate is applied to all incomes. All 
taxpayers benefit from 556.02 PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 2. A system with three income brackets: i) 19 per cent from 0 
to 44,490 PLN, ii) 30 per cent from 44,490 to 85,528 PLN, iii) 40 per cent over 
85,528 PLN. All taxpayers benefit from 586.85 PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 3. A system with two income brackets: i) 18 per cent from 0 to 
85,528 PLN, ii) 32 per cent over 85,528 PLN. All taxpayers benefit from 556.02 
PLN tax credit. 
BASIC SYSTEM 4. A system with four income brackets: i) 10 per cent from 0 to 
20,000 PLN, ii) 20 per cent from 20,000 to 40,000 PLN, iii) 30 per cent from 
40,000 to 90,000 PLN, iv) 40 per cent over 90,000 PLN. All taxpayers benefit 
from 500.00 PLN tax credit. 
For each taxpayer, the tax ( )iT x  that results after the application of a basic 
tax system is then modified by a random factor, so that net income becomes 
( ) ( )i i i i iy x T x z T x= − + ⋅ ; the factor zi is drawn: 
  (a) from the uniform distributions: 
  (a1) ( )~ 0.2 0.2Z U − ÷ , (a2) ( )~ 0 0.4Z U ÷ ; 
  (b) from the normal distributions: 
  (b1) )0133.0 ; 0(~ NZ , (b2) )12.0 ; 0(~ NZ ; 
Then, each basic system generates four sub-systems. When the normal 
distribution is applied, the random factor zi is considered in absolute value; the 
programme did not allow incomes to become either negative or greater that 2xi. 
In this way we receive  the following sixteen hypothetical tax systems: 
T-S_1:  BASIC SYSTEM 1 modified by a random factor (a1) 
T-S_2:  BASIC SYSTEM 2 modified by a random factor (a1) 
T-S_3:  BASIC SYSTEM 3 modified by a random factor (a1) 
T-S_4:  BASIC SYSTEM 4 modified by a random factor (a1) 
T-S_5:  BASIC SYSTEM 1 modified by a random factor (a2) 
T-S_6:  BASIC SYSTEM 2 modified by a random factor (a2) 
T-S_7:  BASIC SYSTEM 3 modified by a random factor (a2) 
T-S_8:  BASIC SYSTEM 4 modified by a random factor (a2) 
482                                                     E. Mazurek, A. Vernizzi: Some considerations on … 
 
 
 
T-S_9:  BASIC SYSTEM 1 modified by a random factor (a1) 
T-S_10:  BASIC SYSTEM 2 modified by a random factor (b1) 
T-S_11:  BASIC SYSTEM 3 modified by a random factor (b1) 
T-S_12:  BASIC SYSTEM 4 modified by a random factor (b1) 
T-S_13:  BASIC SYSTEM 1 modified by a random factor (a2) 
T-S_14:  BASIC SYSTEM 2 modified by a random factor (b2) 
T-S_15:  BASIC SYSTEM 3 modified by a random factor (b2) 
T-S_16:  BASIC SYSTEM 4 modified by a random factor (b2) 
 
Appendix 2. On the sign of (PEA─PET) for income unit pairs from group (3) 
 
From expressions (18), (19) and (22), the pair {i, j} contributes to ( )3APE at a 
greater extent than to ( )3TPE  if  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )| |T X A A X Ti j i j i j X i j i j i j i jt t I a a I I t t Iλµ− − − −− + − − ≥ − .   (A.1) 
For the sake of simplicity and without any lack of generality, let us consider 
only the differences corresponding to incomes ji xx < ; for group (3), when the 
difference ( )i jx x−  is negative, ( )i jt t− , ( )i ja a− , ( )|A A Xi j i jI I− −− , and Ti jI −  are 
positive, whilst |T Xi jI −  is negative. Then, for group (3), inequality (A.1) is verified 
if 
( ) ( )i j X i ja a t tλµ− ≥ − ,  for ji xx < , ji aa > , and ji tt > .  (A.2) 
As iii xat =  and, analogously, jjj xat = , (A.2) can be rearranged as  
( ) ( )i X i j X ja x a xλµ λµ− ≥ − .      (A.3) 
Being ji aa > , and ji xx < , we can conclude that, whenever i xx λµ< , strict 
inequality holds.  
Income distributions are, in general, positive skew, so more than 50% of 
incomes are lower than xµ  and even more incomes are lower than xλµ , as we 
expect that λ>1. To understand why λ is greater than 1, observe that if the tax rate 
schedule can be approximated by a strictly concave function of pre-tax incomes, 
(i) due to Jensen’s inequality1, it results in ( )A X Xtµ µ µ <   ; moreover, (ii) if the 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Lambert (2001), page 11. 
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tax distribution can be approximated by a strictly convex function, still due to 
Jensen’s inequality1, it results in ( )X Tt µ µ< . As in general both (i) and (ii) 
happen, a fortiori, we can expect that ( )A T Xµ µ µ< , from which λ>1.  
If i Xx λµ> , strict inequality holds in (A.3), if 
( ) ( )i i x j j xa x a xλµ λµ− < − , or, which is the same, if 
ji x
j x i
ax
x a
λµ
λµ
−
<
−
          (A.4) 
 
which can be either verified or not.  
 
Our simulations (Table 1, column 6) confirm that in group (3) there are more 
income unit pairs which verify inequality (24) than those which do not: the share 
of pairs which verify the inequality is never less than 57.9 %. 
Less immediate is interpreting the effect of λ. If one considers that keeping 
constant all the remaining components in (A.4), the left hand side of the 
inequality is a decreasing function of λ, it can be surprising to observe that the 
percentage of pairs in group (3), which verify (A.3), appears to be inversely 
related to λ. We can try to explain this by observing that the progressivity of a tax 
system does not act only on λ2: by its interactions with different sources of 
unfairness, it acts also on the actual tax rates and, consequently on the ratio 
( )j ia a . It is then difficult foreseeing the final outcomes concerning the 
inequality at (A.4). Moreover there is no reason to believe that the distribution of 
incomes lower than Xλµ  should remain equally distributed through the three 
groups. 
As λ increases  the percentage of violations of both Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 
decreases as we can see from Table 1, columns (2), (4) and (5), progressivity 
should augment the theoretical distance of net incomes. Another not surprising 
result is that, for what concerns Axiom 2 violations (column 12), the relative 
correction, expressed by the ratio 
( )
( )2
T
2
XA
G
R | , appears to be a direct function of λ. 
We conclude observing that in column (14) the ratio 
( )
( )3
T
3
XA
G
R |  assumes nearly 
constant values in all the simulated tax systems, ranging from 4.448 to 4.720. 
 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Lambert (2001), page 223. 
2 From Table 1, column (2), we can see that λ is highest for tax systems T-S_4, T-S_8, T-S_12 and T-
S_16, which derive from the most progressive basic system, the fourth one. Conversely it is lowest 
for T-S_1, T-S_5, T-S_9 and T-S_13, which derive from basic system 1, which has only one and 
quite low tax rate (15%). 
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Appendix 2. The decomposition of the redistributive effect 
 
The Kakwani progressivity index, |T X XP C G= − , is based on the Jakobsson-
Fellman and the Jakobsson-Kakwani theorems.1  
First of all, from the Jakobsson-Fellman theorem it follows that if the derivative 
of the tax rate is non-negative, i.e. ( ) 0' ≥xa , then 0P ≥ . 
Let us now consider two different tax systems, ( )1t x  and ( )2t x , applied to 
a same income distribution. If the tax elasticities the two tax systems, 
( ) ( ) ( )'1 1 1LP x t x a x =    and ( ) ( ) ( )
'
2 2 2LP x t x a x =   , are such that 
( ) ( )1 2LP x LP x≤ , then, from the Jakobsson-Kakwani theorem, it follows that 
1 2P P≤ . 
The redistributive effect of a tax system, which is defined as the difference 
between X YRE G G= −
2, can be represented in terms of the Kakwani 
progressivity index and of the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani re-ranking index, as 
per formula (1): 
     ( )| |Y Y X Y XRE P G C P Rτ τ= − − = − . 
By this expression one can immediately evaluate how much of the 
redistributive effect depends on the tax progressivity and how much is lost due to 
the re-ranking of incomes; it follows that Pτ  represents the redistributive effect 
which would be achieved if no income re-ranking were introduced by taxes.3 
If the tax ordering coincides with the pre-tax income ordering, we have that 
|T X TC G= , and, consequently, T XP G G= − . If the two orderings do not coincide, 
being |T X TC G< , it results that T XP G G< − , and, consequently, 
( )XT GGP −<ττ  : ( )XT GG −τ  is the potential redistributive effect which would be 
achieved if neither post-tax income re-ranking nor tax re-ranking occurred, with 
respect to the pre-tax income ordering. 
We introduce the indicator function ( )gi jI −  (g=1, 2, 3): 
- ( )1 jiI −  is 1 when both the sign of ( )i jt t−  and the sign of ( )i ja a−  are not 
opposite to that of ( )i jx x− , ( )1 jiI −  is 0 otherwise; 
                                                          
1 Lambert (2001), pp.190-191, 199-200. 
2 Lambert (2001), pp.37-41. 
3  As already stressed in footnote 3, |Y XR  is non-negative; it is zero when XYY CG |= . 
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- ( )2jiI −  is 1 when the sign of ( )i jt t−  is not opposite to that of ( )i jx x− , and, 
conversely, the sign of ( )i ja a−  is opposite to that of ( )i jx x− ; ( )2jiI −  is 0 
otherwise; 
- ( )3 jiI −  is 1 when both the sign of ( )i jt t−  and the sign of ( )i ja a−  are opposite to 
that of ( )i ja a− , ( )3 jiI −  is 0 otherwise.  
Therefore, ( )gi jI −  selects income unit pairs in relation to their behaviour in 
fulfilling Axiom 1 and Axiom 2. 
In more general terms we can write as follows: 
( ) 1 for income unit pairs belonging to group ( ) 
0 otherwise
g
i j
g
I −

= 

, (g=1, 2, 3). 
By applying the indicator function ( )gi jI − , we can decompose |T XC  as: 
          ( ) ( ) ( )3XT
2
XT
1
XTXT CCCC |||| ++=  
Having in mind expression (6), ( )1XTC |  can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( )∑∑
=
−−
=
−=
K
i
1
ji
XT
jij
K
j
iji
T
1
XT IIppttN
C
1
|
1
2| 2
1
µ
    (A.5) 
When ( ) 1=−
1
jiI , that is when income unit pairs are selected from group (1), the 
equality T ji
XT
ji II −− =
|  holds, so, as (A.5) yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )| 2
1 1
1
2
K K
1 1 1T
T X i j i j i j i j T
i jT
C t t p p I I G
Nµ − −= =
= − =∑∑ .       (A.6) 
Analogously, also when ( )2 1i jI − = , that is when income unit pairs are selected 
from group (2), it results that ( ) ( )2T
2
XT GC =| , because, for all income unit pairs from 
group (2), we have T ji
XT
ji II −− =
| . 
Differently for income unit pairs from group (3), which are selected by 
( ) 1=−
3
jiI , we have 
( ) ( )3
T
3
XT GC −=| . This is due to the fact that in the expression 
 ( ) ( ) ( )3 3|| 2
1 1
1
2
K K
T X
T X i j i j i j i j
i jT
C t t p p I I
Nµ − −= =
= −∑∑ ,    (A.7) 
the indicator function |T Xi jI −  has sign opposite to 
T
i jI − ; using ( ) T jiXT ji II −− ⋅−= 1| , (A.7) 
yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3| 2
1 1
11
2
K K
T
T X i j i j i j i j
i jT
C t t p p I I
Nµ − −= =
= − −∑∑ ( )3TG= − .   (A.8) 
From ( ) ( )|
1 1
T X TC G= , 
( ) ( )2
T
2
XT GC =| , and 
( ) ( )3
T
3
XT GC −=| , it follows that  
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( ) ( ) ( )
| | 0
1 1 1
T X T T XR G C= − = , 
( ) ( ) ( )
| | 0
2 2 2
T X T T XR G C= − = , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
| | 2
3 3 3 3
T X T T X TR G C G= − = .
 (A.9) 
 
Also the re-ranking index |A XR  can be decomposed into three components: 
   ( ) ( ) ( )3XA
2
XA
1
XAXA RRRR |||| ++= ,      (A.10) 
with  
( )
|
1
A XR =0, 
( ) ( )
| |2
2 2
A X A XR G= , and 
( ) ( )
| 2
3 3
A X AR G= .    (A.11) 
The first element of the sum in equation (A.10), ( ) ( ) ( )| |
1 1 1
A X A A XR G C= − , equals 
zero, because ( ) ( )1A
1
XA GC =| . Using formulae (5) and (6) we can write: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 jiA jij
K
i
i
K
j
ji
A
1
A IIppaaN
G −−
= =
∑∑ −=
1 1
2  2
1
µ
,    (A.12) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 jiXA jij
K
i
i
K
j
ji
A
1
XA IIppaaN
C −−
= =
∑∑ −= |
1 1
2|  2
1
µ
.    (A.13) 
When income unit pairs are selected from group (1), that is when ( ) 11i jI − = , the 
differences ( )i ja a−  and ( )i jx x−  have the same sign and, consequently, in 
(A.12) and in (A.13) the equality A ji
XA
ji II −− =
|  holds, from which it follows that 
( ) ( )1
A
1
XA GC =| . 
Conversely, both ( ) ( ) ( )2XA
2
A
2
XA CGR || −=  and 
( ) ( ) ( )3
XA
3
A
3
XA CGR || −=  are greater than 0. 
For income units pairs from group (2), that is when ( ) 1=−
2
jiI , having the 
differences ( )i ja a−  and ( )i jx x−  opposite sign, it follows that ( ) A jiXA ji II −− ⋅−= 1| . 
Therefore, we have 
    ( ) ( ) ( )2jiXA jij
K
i
i
K
j
ji
A
2
XA IIppaaN
C −−
= =
∑∑ −= |
1 1
2|  2
1
µ
 
       ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2
1 1
11  
2
K K
2 2A
i j i j i j i j A
i jA
a a p p I I G
Nµ − −= =
= − − = −∑∑ .   (A.14) 
As ( )2XAC |  has opposite sign with respect to 
( )2
AG , it is verified that 
( ) ( )2
A
2
XA GR 2| = . 
Analogously, for what concerns ( )3XAR | , as 
( ) ( )3
A
3
XA GC −=| , we can verify that 
( ) ( )3
A
3
XA GR 2| = . 
Equations (A.6)−(A.14) illustrate equivalences and relations reported in (12) 
and (13). 
 
 
 
